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Abstract This paper analyzes a set of global energy-economic development scenarios for 
the 21" century. The set includes non-climate-policy scenarios that are part of the recent 
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). We apply climate policies to some of these scenarios to achieve 
stabilization of atmospheric C02 concentrations at 550 parts per million by volume 
(ppmv). In particular, we analyze the robustness of technology portfolios under a wide 
range of possible future socioeconomic and technological outcomes. Clearly, the baseline 
assumptions determine the choice and costs of optimal emissions mitigation portfolios. 
The robustness analysis suggests that traditional electricity generation technologies based 
on fossil fuels are phased-out across all scenarios by 2100, with gas combined-cycle 
bridging the transition to more advanced fossil and zero-carbon technologies. Hydrogen 
fuel cells dominate the power sector in the sustainable development scenarios. In the 
transport sector, oil products will be phased-out but their future substitutes remain uncer-
tain. Policies should preferably target a combination of sustainable development and 
accelerated technological change. 
Key words Energy-economic scenarios · Emissions mitigation · Sustainable development · 
Energy technology strategies · IPCC SRES 
1 Introduction 
Mankind is faced with the profound challenge that its economic activities and 
resulting emissions of gases might lead to global warming, with significant envi-
ronmental and economic impacts for our planet. Consistent with the potentially 
enormous economic magnitude of the climate change problem for future genera-
tions, many different types of aggregate macroeconomic analyses have been 
conducted in recent years (see, e.g., EMF14 1994; Wigley et al. 1996), mainly to 
help in designing optimal environmental tax strategies. On the other hand, the 
historical experience of the last 200 years since the beginning of industrialization 
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indicates that technological innovations and the speed of technology diffusion 
have driven economic growth, and vice versa (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995; 
Maddison 1993). New technological developments have helped to overcome the 
then current environmental and social problems, but in most cases they have also 
caused new kinds of challenges. In any case, energy technologies have proven to 
be powerful drivers of environmental change. 
To design climate policies targeted at specific energy technology clusters, 
we need to understand how well different technology portfolios might do in 
the next century, in economic and environmental terms. In this paper, we 
analyze the robustness of different technology portfolios under a wide range of 
possible future socioeconomic and technological outcomes. We illustrate our 
point with thirteen, state-of-the-art, global energy-economic development sce-
narios. These scenarios illustrate possible future pathways of the world energy 
system. They are long-term scenarios for the 21st century, since a time scale of 100 
years or more is characteristic for interactions1 between human activities2 and 
climate change. 
In our analysis, we compare the following different sets of scenarios: 
• Nine non-climate policy scenarios. These scenarios are versions of scenarios 
(created by the authors) that are part of the recent Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (SRES 2000; Nakicenovic (ed.) 2000) . We refer to these 
scenarios as IIASA SRES scenarios. 
- Five baseline reference scenarios. This subset of the IIASA SRES scenarios 
leads to relatively high GHG emissions levels by the end of the 21st century. 
They are non-sustainable in terms of resource use, equity, environmental 
impacts, or for other reasons (see Section 2.1.1.). 
- Four sustainable development scenarios. This subset of the IIASA SRES 
scenarios explores possible pathways of sustainable development. In these 
scenarios, relatively low GHG emissions levels are achieved through com-
binations of policies not customarily thought of as climate policies at all 
(see Section 2.1.2.) . 
• Four carbon dioxide (C02) mitigation scenarios. Using the IIASA SRES 
scenarios (SRES 2000) as baselines we study cost-optimal strategies and 
cross-benefits from individual emissions reduction measures, to stabilize 
atmospheric C02 concentrations at 550ppmv (parts per million by volume) 
by the end of the 21st century (see Section 2.2.). We restrict ourselves to 
analyzing C02 mitigation in the global energy sector, since C02 is the main 
anthropogenic (i.e., due to human activities) contributor to climate 
1 Note that the nature of these interactions is still highly uncertain, and uncertainties in 
demographic and economic development and technological progress are large. 
2 Human activities, such as energy production and use, result in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. changes in the atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, their influence on changes in 
the radiative balance of the planet, and, hence, climate change. 
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change.3 The portfolio of future response strategies will include an appropriate 
economic and regulatory framework for consumers and investors, leading edge 
technologies, and "no regrets" solutions. 
2 Energy-economic development scenarios 
This section presents and compares different groups of energy-economic, global 
development scenarios for the 21'1 century (see Table 1). Appendix I briefly 
summarizes the main characteristics of the modeling framework that was used by 
the authors to quantify these scenarios (i.e. , alternative future pathways) of the 
global energy system and GHG emissions. The principal models and data sets 
that were used include the Scenario Generator (SG) (Nakicenovic et al.1998a,b), 
the bottom-up energy systems engineering model MESSAGE4 (Messner and 
Strubegger 1995), the top-down macroeconomic model MACRO (Messner and 
Schrattenholzer 1999), the climate impact model MAGICC5 (Wigley and Raper 
1997), and several databases, including the C02DB (Messner and Strubegger 
1991). 
Non-climate-policy scenarios6 (Section 2.1.) describe possible future pathways 
in the case that no direct climate policies are introduced on a global scale. 
A subset of these non-climate-policy scenarios, the sustainable development 
scenarios (Section 2.1.2.), are based on a wide range of non-climate-policies that 
aim to achieve sustainable development, and are particularly geared toward 
equity issues. These scenarios often lead to relatively low GHG emissions levels. 
Another subset of the non-climate-policy scenarios, the baseline reference sce-
narios (Section 2.1.1.), lead to significant GHG emissions levels. These scenarios 
are used as baselines to create C02 mitigation scenarios in Section 2.2., where 
climate policies lead to a stabilization of atmospheric C02 concentrations at a 
level of 550ppmv. 
In the real world the division lines between these categories of future pathways 
are vague, since there are multiple links and interactions between economic 
.i C02 from past emissions is currently responsible for more than 60% of the enhanced 
greenhouse effect that is due to human activities (IPCC 1996). Other important anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases are, e.g., methane (CH4) , nitrous oxide (N20), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
tropospheric ozone, and other gases. These anthropogenic emissions have significantly altered 
the atmospheric composition. Whereas carbon dioxide levels varied by less than 10% during the 
10000 years before industrialization, since 1800 these levels have risen by almost 30%. The 
ozone precursors nitrogen oxides (NO,), carbon monoxide (CO), and non-methane hydrocar-
bons or volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs) are not greenhouse gases themselves, but are 
involved in a complex chain of reactions in the troposphere that lead to the production of 
ozone, an important greenhouse gas. Trajectories for all these gases are modeled for the 
scenarios presented in this paper. 
4 MESSAGE: Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environ-
mental Impact. 
5 MAG ICC: Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change. 
6 Note that the Evaluation Report of the IPCC (1995) refers to these scenarios as non-
intervention scenarios. 
Table 1. Overview of scenario drivers and results 
Type of Scenario Gross Equity. Atmospheric 
(Il: Baseline Domestic Ratio of co, Global 
reference, Product incomes Cumulative Concentration Temperature 
M: Mitigation', (GDP) between DEV Primary co, ("S" means so, Change 
S: Sustainable Population !trillion and IND Energy Emissions stabilized) Emissions '(relative to 
development) fhillion] (1990) US$] regions in 2 IOO [EJ] [GtC] foomvl [MtS] 1990) [°Cl 
Scenario/Year 2050 2100 2050 2100 2100 2050 2100 1990-2 !00 2100 2050 2!00 2100 
A2 13 11.30 15.07 82 243 0.24 !014 1921 1662 783 100 66 2.7 
A2-550 M 11.30 15.07 81 236 0.23 959 1571 1210 -550 (S) 81 54 2.1 
B2 13 9.37 10.41 110 235 0.33 869 1357 1143 603 54 45 2.0 
B2-550 M 9.37 10.41 !09 231 0.33 881 1227 971 -550 (S) 56 38 1.8 
AI B 8.70 7.06 187 550 0.64 1422 2681 1562 724 55 29 2.4 
AI-550 M 8.70 7.06 186 547 0.63 1339 2505 1095 -550 (S) 47 19 1.9 
AlC B 8.70 7.06 187 550 0.64 1377 2325 2046 950 122 47 3.0 
AIC-550 M 8.70 7.06 185 542 0.64 1269 2188 1093 -550 (S) 71 30 2.0 
AIG B 8.70 7.06 187 550 0.64 1495 2737 2092 891 68 38 2.8 
AIT s 8.70 7.06 187 550 0.64 1213 2021 1122 560 41 17 1.9 
Bl s 8.70 7.06 136 328 0.59 837 755 842 486 (S) 28 9 1.7 
BIG s 8.70 7.06 166 350 0.60 911 1157 902 509 31 13 1.8 
BIT s 8.70 7.06 136 328 0.59 819 714 776 464 (S) 27 8 1.6 
Compare with 1990 values for population (5.3 billion), GDP (20.9 trillion (1990) US$) , equity ratio between today's developing and industrialized regions (0.06), primary energy 
(352 EJ), total CO, emissions (7 .5 GtC), CO, concentration (354 ppmv), SO, emissions (69.0 MtS), and temperature change from 1765 to 1990 (0.4°C assuming a climate 
sensitivity of 2.5°C (Wigley and Raper 1997)) 
DEV, today's developing countries; IND, today's industria lized countries 
7 
"M" denotes mitigation scenarios that achieve stabilization of atmospheric C02 concentration. 
8 Assuming a climate sensitivity of 2.5°C. 
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Fig. 1. Global shares in primary energy use , coal, oil/gas, and non-fossil energy, illustrated 
with an "energy triangle" (in percent). Constant market shares of coal , oil/gas, and non-
fossil (zero-carbon) energies are denoted by their respective isoshare lines. Historical data 
from 1850 to 1990 are based on Nakicenovic et al. 1998a. For the years 1990 to 2100, 
alternative trajectories unfold for the five baseline reference scenarios A2, B2, Al, AlG, 
and AlC, and for the four 550ppmv C02 concentration stabilization cases A2-550, B2-550, 
Al-550, and AlC-550. However, the four sustainable development scenarios Bl, BlG, 
BlT, and AlT show similar shifts first toward gas and later toward zero-carbon options 
development, ecosystem resilience, poverty, environmental degradation, life-
styles, socioeconomic equity, and different effective policy responses. Clearly, 
climate policies will have significant consequences for sustainable development 
on both the global and sub-global scales. And policy responses to sustainable 
development issues may affect our ability to develop and successfully implement 
climate policies. Nevertheless, the authors decided to categorize their scenarios 
into the different groups, because it provides additional insight into the relative 
impacts of the different measures. 
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the world primary energy structure over 
time.9 The historical changes reflect major technology shifts, from traditional use 
9 In this paper, we adopt as primary energy accounting methodology the direct equivalent 
method for all non-thermal uses of renewables and nuclear. For instance, the primary energy 
equivalence of electricity generated from solar photovoltaics or nuclear power plants is set 
equal to their respective gross electricity output and not the heat equivalent of radiation energy 
from fissile reaction, the solar radiance falling onto a photovoltaic panel and converted to 
electricity (with efficiencies ranging from 10% to 15% ), or the heat that would have to be 
generated by the burning of fossil fuels to produce the same amount of electricity as generated 
in a photovoltaic cell or a nuclear reactor (which would be the so-called "substitution" account-
ing method). 
94 K. Riahi and R.A. Roehr! 
of renewable energy flows to the coal and steam age of the 19th century to the 
dominance of oil and internal combustion engines in the 20th century. Around 
1850, only about 20% of world primary energy was provided by coal, with the 
other 80% provided by traditional renewable energies (biomass, direct wind and 
hydropower, and animal and human energy). With the rise of industrialization, 
coal substituted for traditional renewable energy forms, and by 1920 around 
three quarters of world primary energy use relied on coal. The second major 
transition was the replacement of coal by oil and later by gas. By the early 1970s, 
56% of global primary energy use was based on oil and gas. Since then, the global 
primary energy structure has changed little, and efforts to substitute for oil 
imports have led to a certain revival of coal and to the introduction of non-fossil 
alternatives in the OECD countries (e.g., nuclear energy in France). Rapid 
growth in energy demand and coal use, particularly in Asia, have outweighed 
energy structural changes in the OECD countries. 
2.1 Non-climate-policy scenarios 
The group of non-climate-policy scenarios presented in this paper are based on a 
set of narrative descriptions, so-called storylines, that were created by a team of 
international researchers for the IPCC's Special Report on Emissions (SRES 
2000; N akicenovic (ed.) 2000). 10 
Clearly, certain combinations of scenario driving forces will be more likely 
than others, since many interrelationships exist between these driving forces . 
However, because of the complexity of these interrelationships one is left with 
a wide (though not arbitrary) range of consistent combinations of driving forces, 
based on different assumptions of socioeconomic development, technological 
progress, and political change. These result in widely differing world energy 
systems (Fig. 1), which are all cost-optimal strategies under the given assump-
tions, and lead to a wide range of emissions levels (see, e.g., Table 1, Figs. 2, 3, and 
4). 
We start with a brief characterization of the four groups of non-climate-policy 
scenarios. 
• A2: The A2 scenario foresees future development toward a very heterogeneous 
world, characterized by high population growth in the developing regions, self-
reliance in terms of resources, and less emphasis on economic, social, and 
cultural interactions between world regions. Eventually, the world "consoli-
dates" into a series of economic trade blocks. Compared to the other scenarios 
in this paper, A2 is characterized by relatively slow capital stock turnover, 
slower technological change, and a more slowly narrowing income gap be-
tween today's industrialized and developing countries. 
to In addition to the scenario quantifications created with the IIASA modeling framework that 
are described in this paper, the reproducibility of these scenarios was confirmed with emulation 
runs created using five other models (SRES 2000; Nakicenovic (ed.) 2000). 
Energy technology strategies 
30 -- - -- ---- - --- ----- ---
"' 
.§ 0 25 
"' -'Cl 
·e ::;: 20 
.. "O 
~ c 
8 ~ 15 
- "' 
"'"' 
.g .E 10 (; -
Historical Sc.enario 
____ ______________ ___ tcaJ~t~,,~~ ___ _ 
5 - - - --------------
Baseline 
reference 
scenarios 
550 ppmv 
-: /stabilization q scer .. 1rios 
o.J,::::==~::=::;.._~~+-~~~~~~~--1 \Sustainable development 
2100 scenarios 1900 1950 2000 2050 
Year 
95 
Fig. 2. Global C02 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production. Histori-
cal data from 1850 to 1990 from Marland et al. (1999). Three groups of future development 
scenarios for 1990 to 2100: (i) Baseline reference scenarios (ii) Sustainable development 
scenarios (iii) C02 mitigation scenarios that stabilize at 550ppmv atmospheric C02 
concentration 
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Fig. 3. Global anthropogenic sulphur dioxide emissions in MtS 
• B2: The B2 world is one of increased concern for environmental and social 
sustainability compared to the A2 world. It is a heterogeneous world with more 
diverse technological change. International institutions decline in importance, 
with a shift toward local and regional decision-making structures and insti-
tutions. Human welfare, equality, and environmental protection all have 
high priority, and they are addressed through community-based, social solu-
tions in addition to technical solutions, albeit implementation rates vary across 
regions. 
• Al (Al, AlC, AlG, and AlT): The Al world describes a future world of very 
rapid economic growth and low population growth, in which regional average 
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Fig. 4. Global anthropogenic methane emissions in MtCH4 
incomes per capita converge to the extent that the current distinctions between 
"poor" and "rich" countries eventually dissolve. The main dynamics is based 
on a strong commitment to market-based solutions. The world is characterized 
by a strong commitment to education, high rates of investment, and increas.ed 
international mobility of people, ideas, and technology, accelerated by ad-
vances in communication technologies. Due to the particularly large uncertain-
ties in future technological progress in this case, four different cases are 
analyzed according to different resource and technology development 
assumptions: 
AlC: "Clean coal" technologies that are generally environmentally friendly 
with the exception of GHG emissions; 
AlG: "Oil and gas"-rich future, with a swift transition from conventional 
resources to abundant unconventional resources including methane 
clathrates; 
Al T: "Post-fossil" future, with rapid development of solar and advanced 
nuclear technologies 11 on the supply side, and mini-turbines and fuel cells 
used in energy end-use applications; 
Al: "Balanced" progress across all resources and technologies from energy 
supply to end-use. 
• Bl (Bl, BlG, BlT): The Bl world describes a future world that chooses 
collectively and effectively to pursue service-oriented economic prosperity 
while taking into account equity and environmental concerns without policies 
11 Advanced nuclear power plants are defined as technologies that produce energy with higher 
efficiency and increased safety compared to today's nuclear standards. Their technological 
design is not pre-specified in the model. Advanced nuclear technologies should be interpreted 
as a technology cluster (consisting of various different designs) rather than a single individual 
technology. The cluster might include e.g., efficient high temperature reactors (that produce 
hydrogen), new fast breeder reactors with modified designs, but also other imaginable options 
for nuclear fission . 
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directed at mitigating climate change. It is a rapidly converging world, charac-
terized by "dematerialization" and the introduction of clean technologies. The 
emphasis is on global solutions for environmental and social sustainability, 
including concerted efforts for rapid technology development, demateria-
lization of the economy, and improving equity. Technological change plays an 
important role. 
- BlG: "Gas and non-fossil future"; 
- B 1 T: Particularly rapid shift to non-fossil and decentralized technologies; 
- Bl: "Balanced" progress across all resources and technologies. 
Altogether, the scenarios illustrate the large uncertainties of the scenario base-
lines. They also illustrate the fact that similar GHG emissions levels may be 
reached with very different combinations of input assumptions. 
2.1.l Baseline reference scenarios 
Among the set of nine non-climate-policy scenarios, five scenarios (A2, B2, Al, 
AlC, AlG) lead to relatively high levels of GHG emissions and/or high levels of 
acidification (Table 1, Figs. 2, 3, 4). These scenarios are described here and are 
used in Section 2.2. as baseline scenarios to introduce climate policies. 
A2 baseline scenario The A2 world represents a differentiated world, which 
"consolidates" into a series of economic regions. Economic growth is uneven and 
the income gap between poor and rich regions does not narrow as much as in the 
other scenarios (Table 1). Global average per capita income in A2 is low relative 
to the other baselines outlined in this paper, and gross world product (GWP) 
reaches about US$243 trillion. International disparities in productivity, and 
hence income per capita, are largely maintained or increased in absolute terms. 
Fertility rates decline relatively slowly, which leads to a steadily increasing world 
population reaching 15 billion by 2100. A combination of slow technological 
progress (Table 2), more limited environmental concerns, and low land availabil-
ity because of high population growth means that the energy needs of the A2 
Table 2. Technology improvements in the scenarios 
Technology Improvements 
Coal Oil Gas Non-fossil 
A2 Average Low Low Low-Average 
B2 Low Average Average-High Average 
Al High High High High 
AlG Low Very High Very High Median 
AlC High Low Low Low 
AlT Low High High Very High 
Bl Low-Average Average-High High High 
BIG Low-Average Average-High High High 
BIT Low-Average High High Very High 
The categorization is made relative to the other scenarios, not relative to technologies running on 
different fu els. For a detailed report on assumed technology costs in the scenarios, see SRES (2000) 
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world are satisfied primarily by fossil (mostly coal) and nuclear energy (Fig. 1). 
However, in some cases regional energy shortages force investments into renew-
able alternatives, such as solar and biomass. Regions with abundant energy and 
mineral resources evolve to more resource-intensive economies, while those poor 
in resources place a very high priority on minimizing import dependence through 
technological innovation to improve resource efficiency and make use of substi-
tute inputs. The fuel mix in different regions is determined primarily by the 
resource availability (limited to conventional reserves and resources). High-
income but resource-poor regions shift toward advanced post-fossil technologies, 
while low-income resource-rich regions generally rely on traditional fossil tech-
nologies. The A2 world is characterized by relatively slow end-use and supply-
side energy efficiency improvements and slow convergence between regions. All 
this leads to steadily increasing levels of GHG emissions (Figs. 2, 4), with C02 
emissions approaching 28 GtC in 2100. 
B2 baseline scenario 12 In the B2 world, gross world product grows from US$20 
trillion in 1990 to US$235 trillion in 2100 (Table 1).13 This corresponds to a long-
term average growth rate of 2.2% from 1990 to 2100. Most of this growth takes 
place in today's developing countries, but over the long term economic growth 
rates in these regions also decline as labor productivity levels approach those of 
the leading countries. The B2 scenario uses the UN median 1998 population 
projection (UN 1998), that describes a continuation of historical trends, including 
recent faster-than-expected fertility declines, toward a completion of the demo-
graphic transition within the next century. Global population increases to 10.4 
billion by 2100.14 Global primary energy needs increase by almost a factor of four 
to 1360 EJ in 2100. Most of this increase takes place in today's developing 
regions. The aggregate global rate at which final energy intensity declines is about 
one percent per year through 2100. Cost improvement rates for most technolo-
gies are moderate, however, they are largest for non-sulfur-emitting technologies 
due to local and regional pollution control (Fig. 3). These include in particular 
wind and solar photovoltaics, but also gas combined-cycle, integrated gasification 
combined-cycle (IGCC), solar thermal power plants, and advanced nuclear 
power plants15 (see also Fig. 1). Coal costs increase in regions with large shares of 
12 See Riahi and Roehr! (2000) for more details. 
13 When not mentioned explicitly otherwise, gross world product (GWP), gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), and related parameters are reported at market exchange rates, in 1990 US$. 
1
• Although , in the long term, global fertility levels gradually approach replacement levels, 
the path and pace of fertility change vary greatly among the regions. 
15 Advanced nuclear power plants are defined as technologies that produce energy with higher 
efficiency and increased safety compared to today's nuclear standards. Their technological 
design is not pre-specified in the model. Advanced nuclear technologies should be interpreted 
as a technology cluster (consisting of various different designs) rather than a single individual 
technology. The cluster might include e.g., efficient high temperature reactors (that produce 
hydrogen), new fast breeder reactors with modified designs, but also other imaginable options 
fo r nuclear fission . 
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deep mined coal and high population densities, although coal costs are assumed 
to remain relatively low in regions with abundant surface coal reserves such as 
North America and Australia. The overall energy system efficiency, from pri-
mary to useful energy,16 increases substantially, from 36% in 1990 to 53% in 2100. 
Altogether, the B2 scenario exhibits linearly increasing global GHG emissions 
(Figs. 2, 4), with C02 emissions reaching 14GtC by 2100. 
Al baseline scenarios17 The Al scenarios describe cases of rapid economic devel-
opment, which implies a replication of the postwar growth experience of Japan 
and South Korea or the recent economic development of China on a global scale, 
making current distinctions between "poor" and "rich" regions largely obsolete. 
Free trade, continued innovation, and a stable political and social climate enable 
developing regions to access knowledge, technology, and capital. The global 
economy is projected to expand rapidly at an average annual rate of 3% to 210018 
(Table 1), which translates into a global economic output of US$550 trillion by 
2100. As a byproduct of rapid economic development and a fast demographic 
transition, income inequities between today's industrialized and developing 
countries almost completely vanish in the course of the 21 '1 century (Table 1 ). We 
use the low population projection reported by Lutz et al. (1996, 1997) that 
combines low fertility with low mortality and central migration rate assumptions. 
After peaking at 8.7 billion in the middle of the 21'1 century, world population 
declines to 7.1 billion in the year 2100 (see Table 1). The Al world is character-
ized by relatively high energy demand (Table 1), compared to the more "green" 
Bl scenarios (see Section 2.1.2.), as low energy prices provide little incentive to 
improve end-use-energy efficiencies, and high income levels encourage comfort-
able and convenient (often energy~intensive) lifestyles. Figure 1 shows possible 
future evolutions of the global primary energy structure from 1990-2100 accord-
ing to different technology dynamics and resource availability assumptions. We 
assume technological change in energy conversion and supply technologies to be 
strongly interrelated. 19 
Coal-intensive Al C. The high-growth, coal-intensive scenario Al C illustrates the 
long-term implications of quickly "running out of conventional oil and gas," 
16 Useful energy is defined as the energy, which is actually consumed by the end-user, e.g., 
radiation from light bulbs, or heat from boilers or heat pumps. Thus, technologies at the useful 
energy level (light bulbs, automobiles, boilers, etc.) have final energy as an input and useful 
energy as an output. 
17 See Roehr! and Riahi (2000) for more details. 
18 This rate is roughly in line with long-term historical experience over the last 100 years 
(Maddison 1993). 
19 Resource availability in each of the scenarios therefore depends on the alternative invest-
ment strategies into exploration, production, and conversion technologies. As outlined in 
Section 2.2.5 on the MESSAGE model, time profiles of costs of energy conversion and supply 
technologies are direct input assumptions. Reserves/resources are split into different cost 
categories following Rogner (1997). In other words, we chose consistent resource and technol-
ogy assumptions; they are not outputs of the model. 
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combined with slow progress in developing alternatives, except for progress in 
coal-related technologies (Table 2). It assumes relatively high-cost improvements 
in new and clean coal technologies such as coal high-temperature fuel cells,20 
integrated coal gasification combined-cycle power plants (IGCC) and coal lique-
faction. Only modest assumptions are made for all other technologies, except for 
nuclear technologies. In terms of resource assumptions, AlC is restricted mainly 
to the availability of currently assessed quantities of conventional oil and gas, 
which results in very high cumulative coal use. In 2100, the main primary energy 
carrier is coal, which has a share of 47%, but all of that coal is converted to high-
quality fuels demanded by the affluent consumers of the 21st century. Demand 
for coal is so large that some world regions run out of coal, whereas large coal 
occurrences remain available in the former Soviet Union, North America, and to 
some extent China. Therefore, a large-scale global methanol trade unfolds. In 
2100, the transport sector, for example, depends on methanol produced from coal 
for 64% of its energy use. Some coal-poor regions try to rely increasingly on 
nuclear technologies to ease their import dependence. Altogether, the AlC 
scenario is the scenario with the highest GHG emissions levels of all scenarios in 
this paper, with C02 emissions approaching 33 GtC by 2100 (Fig. 2). 
Oil- and gas-intensive AJG. The high-growth oil and gas-intensive scenario AlG 
explores a high-growth future with rapid technological progress for extraction 
and conversion technologies (Table 2) of oil and gas (conventional and uncon-
ventional). In addition to the improvement and extension of present oil and gas 
grids and transportation/distribution infrastructure, new natural gas pipelines 
from Siberia, the Caspian, and the Middle East to China, Korea, Japan, and 
South Asia (India) are introduced in the scenario after 2010/2020. It is assumed 
that the extraction of natural gas hydrates and of unconventional oil like oil 
shales or natural bitumen (tar sands) becomes economically feasible on a large 
scale, beyond current niche market applications. This leads to a world dominated 
first by oil and later by gas as primary energy fuels. There is large-scale gas and 
oil trade, mainly from the former Soviet Union and the Middle East. The main 
primary energy carriers in 2100 are natural gas (45%), oil (14%), nuclear (12%), 
and renewables (25 % ) (Fig. 1 ). C02 emissions approach a high level of about 
31 GtC by 2100 (Fig. 2). 
"Balanced technology" Al. The high-growth, "balanced technology" Al base-
line scenario explores "balanced" progress across all resources and technologies 
from energy supply to end use. Investment costs for electricity generation with 
solar photovoltaic technology decrease by a factor of more than 10, those for fuel 
cells, hydrogen, and wind technologies by a factor of2 to 5, and those of advanced 
nuclear technologies by a factor of 1 to 3. Liquid fuels from coal or unconven-
tional oil/gas resources become available at less than $30 per barrel, with costs 
20 With high efficiencies. 
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falling further by about 1 % per year with exploitation of learning curve effects. 
Non-fossil electricity (photovoltaics, advanced nuclear) becomes available at 
costs of less than 10 mills/kWh (0.01$/kWh), and continue to improve further 
(perhaps as low as 1 mills/kWh). Energy resources are taken to be plentiful by 
assuming large reserves of unconventional oil and gas and high levels of improve-
ment in the efficiency of energy exploitation technologies, energy conversion 
technologies, and transport technologies. This results in initially large hydrocar-
bon use which is later increasingly substituted by zero-carbon options. In the Al 
scenario, C02 emissions peak at 20 GtC by 2060, and decline thereafter to 14 GtC 
in 2100 (Fig. 2). 
2.1.2 Sustainable development scenarios 
In this section we consider futures that require radical policy and behavioral 
changes to achieve a transition to a sustainable development path without 
making any explicit assumptions about reduction of GHG emissions.21 These 
scenarios describe relatively low emissions futures (Table 1, Figs. 2, 3, 4). To 
the extent that they do not include explicit policies and measures directed at 
mitigating climate change, they are usually considered to be non-climate-policy 
scenarios. However, there is a certain area of ambiguity as to what constitutes 
policies that are solely directed at climate change, in contrast to those that are 
directed at achieving sustainable development in general. Clearly, there are many 
linkages between environmental issues, sustainability, economic issues, develop-
ment, social issues, and equity. Therefore, it seems valuable to compare and 
analyze sustainable development policies and climate policies. 
In our set of scenarios, we have identified four scenarios as sustainable devel-
opment scenarios that do not incorporate explicit climate policies, but success-
fully achieve environmentally and socially compatible targets. The Bl scenarios 
(Bl, BlG, and BlT) achieve this through a successful combination of interna-
tional collaboration, technological development, energy savings, and environ-
mentally oriented world economics, whereas also a high-energy-demand scenario 
(Al T) may eventually lead to a sustainable development path provided techno-
logical progress is extremely successful, and leads to the rapid deployment of 
clean and efficient technologies. The four sustainable development scenarios all 
show low GHG emissions levels (Figs. 2, 4), as well as low levels of acidification 
(Fig. 3). They are based on moderate use of resources, and achieve very high 
levels of equity. 
Bl sustainable development scenarios (Bl, BIG, BIT) Bl describes a future 
world that chooses collectively and effectively to pursue service-oriented eco-
nomic prosperity while taking into account equity and environmental concerns 
without policies directed at mitigating climate change. A more equitable income 
21 One of the first scenarios in the literature that focussed on the achievement of a sustainable 
development path in the world was formulated by Greenpeace (Lazarus et al. 1993). 
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distribution (Table 1), both within and between regions, is increasingly seen as a 
precondition for sustainable development.22 Global GDP23 reaches US$330 tril-
lion in 2100, which corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 2.5%.24 The 
world population projections used in Bl are identical to those in the Al scenarios 
(see above). Bl is characterized by a strong commitment toward sustainable 
development initiatives and sustainable resources use, and a continuation of the 
present trends of globalization and liberalization. The industrialized countries 
support sustainable development in the poor regions, including technology trans-
fer. Subsidies for traditional energy technologies and fuels are abolished, and 
capital markets increasingly respond negatively to adverse environmental inci-
dents, which leads to careful land management and the deployment of "clean" 
energy technologies (Table 2, Fig. 3). These technologies are developed for 
economic or strategic reasons (rather than for a climate-policy target), and for 
niche markets as part of autonomous economic dynamics. The particular institu-
tional developments in the Bl world favor decentralized energy supply. The 
transport, residential/commercial, and industrial sectors rely increasingly on fuel 
cell-based electricity generation. The BlG scenario explores, in particular, 
natural gas-based infrastructures as a transition to hydrogen as. the dominant fuel, 
whereas BlT illustrates the very optimistic case in which the world energy system 
leapfrogs directly to a hydrogen-based economy. Resulting emissions levels are 
among the lowest of all the scenarios considered here (Figs. 2, 3, 4). In particular, 
C02 emissions in 2100 range from 3GtC in BlT to 6GtC in BlG. 
A IT, a high growth, post-fossil sustainable development scenario Al T, the "post-
fossil " version of the 550 trillion US$ Al scenarios (described in Section 2.1.1) 
explores a case of very rapid technological change for non-fossil alternatives, and 
increased final to end-use efficiency (Tables 1, 2) . A large contrast to the Bl 
scenarios is the very high level of energy services. However, potential adverse 
environmental impacts of such an energy-intensive world economy are increas-
ingly counterbalanced by a rapid development of solar and advanced nuclear 
technologies on the supply side, and mini-turbines and fuel cells used in energy 
end-use applications. Furthermore, Al T would imply the large-scale installation 
of new, inherently safe and cheap nuclear technologies (e.g., future high-
temperature reactors) and new renewable technologies. AlT assumes medium 
levels of resource availability for oil and gas. However, because of fast techno-
logical progress in post-fossil alternatives, oil, gas, and coal extraction levels 
remain relatively small. In 2100, the main primary energy carriers are renewables 
and nuclear 1722 EJ (86%) and natural gas at 196 EJ (10%). The shift toward 
carbon-free and also decentralized technologies is nearly complete in all world 
regions by 2100 (Fig. 1). However, it is not straightforward to determine the 
22 Also, the rapid expansion of telecommunications and information technology gives less-
developed regions important leapfrogging opportunities. 
i> In Bl, concepts of "green" GDP gain increasing importance. 
2
' This rate is slightly less than the long-term historical average. 
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magnitude of targeted R&D investments that would be needed worldwide to 
make such a technology-optimistic scenario feasible. Resulting C02 emissions 
peak at 13 GtC in 2050, and decline thereafter to about 5 GtC in 2100. 
The likelihood of sustainable development scenarios, as outlined in this sec-
tion, depends greatly on how counteracting forces will evolve in the future (de 
Vries et al. 2000). The question arises, as to whether the trends toward globaliza-
tion and worldwide co-operation can be accelerated to the extent quantified in 
the B 1 and Al T scenarios. Some believe that the drive toward cultural identity 
and diversity might be very strong and directed against globalization and 
liberalization (see, e.g., Huntington 1997). In any case, enormous efforts and 
intercultural understanding will be needed, all over the world. Others believe 
that the reality of a "global village" may remain the privilege of a small elite, 
which will become increasingly indifferent to local concerns (Thurow 1996). 
Free-rider behavior of countries, and an increasing unwillingness of people in the 
industrialized countries to sacrifice present consumption-oriented lifestyles, or to 
adopt to new technologies, may be other potential barriers towards a realization 
of the sustainable development scenarios as outlined in this section. 
To sum up, it may be possible to very significantly reduce GHG emissions 
through a combination of policies not customarily thought of as climate policies 
at all. 
Note also that, in the our interpretation, among the C02 stabilization cases 
(that include direct climate policies) described in Section 2.2. below, B2-550 and 
Al-550 (but not AlC-550 or A2-550) might be named "sustainable development 
scenarios." Therefore, sustainable development scenarios may include both cli-
mate policy and non-climate-policy-scenarios. 
2.2 C02 mitigation scenarios 
In the preceding section, a set of non-climate-policy scenarios was analyzed that 
result in a wide range of C02 emissions levels. Some of these scenarios (A2, B2, 
AlC, AlG, Al) show rising C02 emissions profiles, where carbon emissions 
increase to more than double today's emissions level by 2100 (Fig. 2). Since the 
largest anthropogenic contributor to global warming is C02 (IPCC 1996), these 
scenarios might lead to significant climate change impacts (Section 4) in the 2151 
century. Therefore, this section analyzes cost-optimal strategies and cross-
benefits from individual emissions reduction measures, illustrated with alterna-
tive C02 mitigation scenarios.25 
Here we specifically present C02 mitigation scenarios in which emissions tra-
jectories lead to a stabilization of atmospheric C02 concentrations.26 Since large 
25 GHG mitigation scenarios are usually defined as a description and a quantified projection of 
how GHG emissions can be reduced with respect to some baseline scenario to meet specific 
targets. 
26 Mitigation scenarios are usually classified into concentration stabilization scenarios, emission 
stabilization scenarios, and other types of mitigation scenarios. 
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scientific uncertainties remain about expected future emissions levels and techno-
logical pathways (Section 2.1), we have studied a multitude of stabilization cases 
based on a set of diverging baseline scenarios. Using the non-climate-policy 
scenarios with high emissions profiles, A2, B2, Al, and AlC,27 as baseline sce-
narios, the C02 stabilization scenarios A2-550, B2-550, Al-550, and AlC-550 
have been developed. For these stabilization cases we considered the same menu 
of technologies and the same assumptions of resource availability as for the 
baseline scenarios. To achieve stabilization of atmospheric concentrations, global 
linearized C02 concentration limits for the given future target year 2100 were 
introduced into the MESSAGE model via weighted sums of cumulative C02 
emissions from 1990 to 2100.28 The climate-policy scenarios A2-550, B2-550, Al-
550, and AlC-550 are constrained to stabilize atmospheric C02 concentration 
at approximately 550ppmv 29 in 2100. The resulting C02 emissions are illustrated 
in Fig. 2. Note also that the sustainable development scenarios of Section 2.1.2. 
show similar emissions trajectories to the four C02 mitigation/stabilization 
cases described here. Both scenario groups, the sustainable scenarios and the 
stabilization scenarios, cluster around the range of 4 to 7 GtC in 2100 (see Fig. 
2). 
The four stabilization scenarios Al-550, AlC-550, A2-550, and B2-550 are 
based on iterated runs of MESSAGE and MACRO. The macroeconomic 
model MACRO is important, because the carbon constraint increases energy 
prices, which reduces energy demand, other things being equal. MACRO calcu-
lates this macroeconomic effect. Because both MESSAGE and MACRO are 
global optimization models, the model results are cost-optimal actions to meet 
the given carbon constraint. The results assume full spatial and temporal 
flexibility, including the free movement of investments. However, cost-optimal 
C02 emissions reduction possibilities do not necessarily occur in regions that give 
high priority to such reductions and that have the money to pay for them. Indeed, 
currently the cheapest C02 reduction opportunities appear to be in developing 
27 Also the gas-intensive AlG scenario illustrates a high emissions future (31 GtC in 2100). 
However, we do not describe a C02 mitigation case for the AlG baseline in this paper, since 
indicative results (Roehr! and Riahi 2000) show that major findings in this case do not differ 
very much from the coal-intensive AlC case, and since we otherwise overemphasize the 
conclusions from high-growth baselines in the samples used in the robustness analysis of Section 
4. 
28 Emissions from specific years are translated into concentrations in the target year using 
trajectories of weighting factors. These weighting factors represent the contribution of the 
emissions in the year when they take place to the concentration in the year for which the limit 
is set, i.e., the year 2100 in the calculations reported here. In other words, the linearized 
concentration constraints approximate the effects of the carbon cycle (using a time profile of 
when a unit of C02 emitted into the atmosphere is absorbed by a variety of sinks, most notably 
the oceans) . 
29 550ppmv is simply the middle of five stabilization levels analyzed by Wigley et al. (1996). We 
choose it here for illustrative purposes only and do not propose to argue that it would necessar-
ily satisfy the UNFCCC objective of preventing "dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system." 
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countries, while it is the industrialized countries that currently appear most 
willing to pay for them. The stabilization scenarios can thus be seen as possible 
answers to the question, "Which are the best strategies to achieve stabiliza-
tion if the world generally consistent with the (respective) baseline was able 
to successfully coordinate and cooperate on efforts to limit potential global 
warming?" 
In Section 2.2.1, we first focus on the most promising strategies to mitigate 
carbon emissions. Section 2.2.2. then summarizes the economic impact of apply-
ing carbon reduction measures. 
2.2.J Strategies to mitigate carbon emissions 
In general, strategies to mitigate C02 emissions may be based on technological 
change, economic incentives, and institutional frameworks. They range from 
using the carbon sequestering potential of afforestation to demand-side or sup-
ply-side oriented measures in the energy sector, and even so-called geo- and 
cosmo-engineering (Nakicenovic et al. 1993). For simplicity, here we confine our 
discussion to C02 abatement measures in the energy sector. 
In the energy sector, there are many types of technological strategies for 
stabilizing and eventually reducing energy-related emissions, including, e.g., the 
incremental replacement of technologies to improve energy efficiency.30 Another 
number of strategies are often referred to as "add-on" environmental strategies. 
They include, for example, C02 removal by scrubbing and C02 recovery from 
flue gases. After recovery of C02 from the energy system it has to be disposed of, 
stored, or otherwise used. For example in what is called enhanced oil recovery, 
C02 is injected in oil fields (originally to improve the oil recovery rate). C02 may 
also be stored in depleted natural gas and other underground reservoirs, and 
eventually also in the deep ocean (Marchetti 1989). 
To determine the potential for and costs of the various mitigation strategies, 
the choice of the baseline scenario is critically important (Roehr! and Riahi 
2000). A review of the general mitigation scenario literature suggests that the 
characteristics of the baseline scenario driving forces interact in complex ways 
with GHG emissions in the baseline, and with the potential for fuel switching or 
energy efficiency (SRES 2000). In our analysis we use four baseline scenarios to 
explore the most promising reduction measures to stabilize atmospheric carbon 
concentrations. Based on the four baseline scenarios Al, AlC, A2, and B2 (see 
Section 2.1.1.), we have developed a set of four stabilization cases Al-550, AlC-
550, A2-550, and B2-550, that stabilize C02 concentrations at the level of about 
550 ppmv by 2100. 
The resulting C02 emissions trajectories of the four mitigation scenarios are 
shown in Fig. 5 (see also Fig. 2). They are characterized by a peak of about 10 
(B2) to 15 (AlC) GtC around the middle of the 21'1 century. Subsequently, 
emissions decline to slightly less than the 1990 emissions level (6GtC) by 2100 
3
° For example, energy end-use is the least efficient part of the current energy systems and 
therefore has the highest potential for efficiency improvements (Nakicenovic et al. 1998a). 
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Fig. 5. C02 emissions in the baseline scenarios (Al, AlC, A2, and B2) and in the C02 
mitigation scenarios (Al-550, AlC-550, A2-550, and B2-550). The shaded areas depict 
the three main sources of C02 reductions in the global energy systems of the mitigation 
scenarios, compared to the respective baseline scenarios. Structural shifts away from coal, 
carbon scrubbing/removal, and enhanced energy conservation account for the bulk of the 
reductions in all mitigation cases. The contribution of the three mitigation measures to total 
carbon reduction differs widely, depending on the baseline scenario that was explored 
in all the C02 mitigation scenarios. These emissions profiles are close to other 
emissions trajectories for 550ppmv stabilization cases found in the literature 
(Wigley et al. 1996; Roehr! and Riahi 2000). The similarity of the emissions 
pathways indicates limited flexibility of the timing and pace of emissions trajecto-
ries, to achieve C02 concentration stabilization at 550ppmv with the least effort. 
Furthermore, through 2020, emissions levels in the stabilization runs and their 
baseline counterparts are similar. Only after 2020, do emissions reductions be-
come more pronounced. This is partly because power plants have lifetimes on the 
order of 30-40 years, which makes for slow turnover in the energy capital stock, 
and partly because of the temporal flexibility built into the concentration con-
straint. MESSAGE is free to choose when to reduce carbon emissions, and later 
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reductions coinciding with turnover in capital plant are usually cheaper, because 
of both technological progress and discounting.31 
Costs and efforts to reduce carbon emissions to meet a specific concentration 
stabilization target are not only predetermined by the baseline scenario's C02 
emissions. Clearly, to meet a distinct C02 concentration stabilization level, more 
C02 has to be reduced in baseline scenarios with relatively high emissions. For 
example, for the A2 (28 GtC in 2100) and the Al C (32 GtC in 2100) baseline 
scenarios, the necessary C02 reductions in 2100 (Fig. 5) are around three times as 
large as for the Al or B2 baseline scenarios (with emissions of 14 GtC in 2100), in 
order to achieve the same 550ppmv stabilization target. However, the flexibility 
for (or costs of) reducing C02 emissions even differ significantly for baseline 
scenarios with similar emissions levels. They are a function of baseline scenario 
assumptions, such as technological development (cost reductions over time), 
resource availability, and socioeconomic development. 
Baseline assumptions of technological development, resource availability, and 
economic development are also strongly influenced by the choice of emissions 
mitigation strategies in the stabilization cases. The shaded areas in Fig. 5 illustrate 
the main sources of C02 reductions in the global energy systems of the mitigation 
scenarios, compared to the respective baseline scenarios. In all scenarios, three 
principal contributors were identified by MESSAGE and MACRO as the most 
cost-effective route to meet the required stabilization target: 
• Fuel switching away from carbon-intensive fuels such as coal. 
• Scrubbing and removing C02 in power plants and during the production of 
synthetic fuels , mainly methanol, and hydrogen. 
• Lower energy demand (enhanced energy conservation) of the stabilization 
case compared to the baseline counterpart, due to higher energy costs in the 
stabilization cases compared to their baseline scenario counterparts. 
In the A2-550 and B2-550 scenarios, the largest contribution comes from struc-
tural changes in the energy system. Principally, this is a shift away from coal, 
which has the highest C02 emissions per unit of energy. To satisfy the carbon 
constraint, both scenarios make a pronounced shift to less carbon-intensive re-
sources, and coal's share of primary energy decreases from 26% in 1990 to 6% in 
B2-550 and 17% in A2-550 by 2100. See also Fig. 1, where primary energy shares 
for the baseline scenarios are compared to those for the stabilization scenarios. 
In the AlC-550 scenario, C02 scrubbing is the major source of C02 emissions 
reduction. Almost 90% of the emissions reduction in 2100 is due to scrubbing. 
Scrubbing occurs at the level of hydrogen and synthetic fuel production, and in 
the electricity sector. Energy structural changes (the principal contributor to the 
reduction in B2-550 and A2-550) play a minor role in AlC-550. The scenario 
experiences a lock-in into coal as the main future energy source. This is because 
of the high technology improvement rates in the coal sector, which were already 
31 For the scenarios presented in this paper, a discount rate of 5% was applied . 
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assumed for the AlC baseline. Even with the penalty that C02 scrubbing entails 
in the form of additional costs and electricity losses, scrubbing remains an attrac-
tive option in AlC-550. 
Carbon scrubbing is also an important reduction source in the Al-550 scenario. 
More than 50% of the reduction in C02 emissions is due to scrubbing. However, in 
contrast to AlC-550, the main reason for the relatively high share of C02 scrub-
bing is not the low cost assumptions for coal-based technologies. In Al, technol-
ogy cost improvement rates are relatively high32 across all technologies, and coal is 
no exception. The main reason for the high share of scrubbing in Al-550 is rather 
that the potential for structural changes from Al to Al-550 is limited. In 2100, 
zero-carbon options already contribute more than 70% to the energy supply in 
baseline scenario Al (Fig. 1). To meet the stabilization constraint their share rises 
further up to 78% in Al-550, which is already the highest share among the 
stabilization scenarios (see Fig. 1). Consequently, scrubbing/removal of carbon is 
needed to decarbonize the remaining fossil energy system, which accounts for no 
more than 12% of the total primary share in Al-550. By 2100, 4.7 GtC is scrubbed 
and 2.1 GtC reduced due to structural changes in Al-550. 
In all mitigation scenarios, price-induced energy demand reductions contribute 
to C02 emissions reduction. The prices33 of energy increase as a result of the 
applied carbon constraint. The effect of the increased prices is that energy de-
mand and GWP for the stabilization scenarios are reduced,34 compared to their 
baseline counterparts. The emissions reduced due to the demand reductions are 
illustrated in Fig. 5. The A2-550 scenario shows the highest emissions reductions 
due to price-induced energy demand reductions (4GtC in 2100), and Al-550 
shows the smallest effect (1 GtC in 2100). 
2.2.2 Influence of carbon mitigation on economic growth 
As described in Section 2.2.1, the choice of baseline is critically important in 
determining the potential for and costs of various mitigation measures. Here we 
discuss the economic impact of the increased energy costs that are a result of the 
carbon constraint. Table 3 summarizes the losses of GWP in absolute terms and 
as shares of the baseline GWPs. 
The GWP gap between the stabilization scenarios and their mitigation 
scenarios ranges from 0.5 to 2.6% in 2100. This is comparable to results from 
similar studies. For example, Edmonds and Richels (1995) report losses of 0.5 to 
1 % for a 500ppm stabilization constraint. Results for a 550ppmv stabilization 
case from the 14th Energy Modeling Forum for four different models (CSERGE, 
CETA, PEF, and CONN) suggest losses between 0.4 and 3.4% of GWP (EMF14 
32 Technology improvement rates (investment, operation, and maintenance costs) for almost all 
technologies are highest in the Al scenario and lowest in the A2 scenario (Table 2, and SRES 
2000). 
-'
3 As prices, we use shadow-prices calculated by the MESSAGE model. 
-'
4 The price-induced demand and GWP (gross world product) reductions were calculated 
iteratively. Results from the systems-engineering model MESSAGE and from the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium model MACRO were iterated until consistency between the region 's macr-
oeconomic development and its energy use was achieved. 
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Table 3. Gross world product (GWP) losses from the reference case to the mitigation 
scenario in 2100 
GWP Absolute losses Losses in percent 
[trillion (1990) US$] [trillion (1990) US$] [relative to baseline GWP] 
AlC-550 542 8.4 1.5% 
Al-550 547 2.8 0.5% 
A2-550 236 6.4 2.6% 
82-550 231 4.0 1.7% 
Compare the absolute GWP numbers in the stabilization cases with those in the baselines: 550 in AIC 
and Al, 243 in A2, and 235 trillion (1990) US$ in 82 
1994). These losses are still rather small compared to the GWP increase in the 
scenarios: in the lowest scenario, GWP in 2100 is 11 times as large as in 1990, and 
in the highest case as much as 26 times as large. This illustrates that atmospheric 
carbon concentration stabilization at 550ppmv is possible at moderate costs. 
3 Robust energy technology strategies 
In this section, we analyze the robustness of technology portfolios for the 
key sectors of electricity generation and transport, under a wide range of 
possible future socioeconomic and technological outcomes. In particular, 
we explore the robustness of future technology strategies by comparing the 
composition and structure of the technology portfolios found in the different 
scenario sets described in the above sections: the non-climate-policy scenarios 
(Al, AlT, AlC, AlG, B2, A2, Bl, BlG, BlT), the sustainable development 
scenarios without explicit climate policies (AlT, Bl, BlG, BlT), and the C02 
mitigation/stabilization scenarios (Al-550, AlC-550, B2-550, A2-550). This 
also provides valuable information on the robustness of C02 mitigation options. 
For related information on assumed technology costs in the scenarios, please 
refer to Chapter 4 of the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES, 2000). 
Due to the large number of technologies (around 400) specified in the 
MESSAGE scenario quantifications (see Appendix I), in this section we present 
results for aggregated technology data for the transport and the electricity gen-
eration sectors on the world level only. We show ranges (minimum, maximum) 
and averages of future market shares within the respective sectors and across all 
three scenario sets (see Figs. 6, 7, 8, and 9). We interpret the frequent occurrence 
of a technology in the portfolio as a strong agreement on the technology's 
promising future potential. Hence, a technology that contributes much to the 
technology portfolio across all scenarios is considered to be a robust future 
technology option (in Figs. 6 to 9, this is the case when a technology shows a high 
minimum share). Small ranges around the average market share of a technology 
indicate a high agreement (high certainty) on the future share itself (i.e., when the 
minimum and the maximum are close to the average of a technology in Figs. 6 to 
9). In other words, especially robust options with low uncertainty regarding their 
future shares are those technologies that show high minimum shares and small 
deviations around their average shares in Figs. 6 to 9. 
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Fig. 7. Ranges and averages of market shares (in percent) of the global electricity sector 
for aggregate technologies in 2100. Abbreviations used to indicate the aggregate technolo-
gies on the horizontal axis are explained in Appendix II 
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Fig. 8. Correlation40 matrices (R2) for market shares of (aggregate) zero-carbon technolo-
gies vs. fossil fuel technologies in the global electricity sector from 2000 to 2100. Abbrevia-
tions used to indicate the aggregate technologies on the axes are explained in Appendix II. 
Black squares (R2 close to 100%) denote technology pairs where market shares evolve 
positively linear (i.e., in parallel and in the same direction), whereas white squares (R2 
close to -100%) show a negatively linear relationship, i.e., technologies are substitutes for 
each other throughout the 21" century 
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Fig. 9. Ranges and averages of market shares of the global transport sector for aggregate 
technologies in 2050 
3.1 Global electricity sector 
Electricity generation in 1990 was dominated by fossil fuels (65% of total electric-
ity output), supplemented by 17% nuclear power and 18% hydro power. In 
almost all scenarios analyzed here, the structure of the electricity sector and the 
corresponding electricity technology portfolio changes significantly throughout 
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the 21st century. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the electricity market shares of tech-
nologies in the scenarios for the years 2050 and 2100, respectively. 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the ranges (difference between minimum and maxi-
mum market share) of individual technologies for the scenario sets described in 
Section 2, that is, the non-climate-policy scenarios, the sustainable development 
scenarios, and the C02 mitigation/stabilization scenarios. The set of non-climate-
policy scenarios show the largest ranges of market shares for almost all technolo-
gies.35 These ranges indicate the high uncertainty for the adoption of specific 
electricity technology portfolios. This also explains the wide range of resulting 
C02 emissions for non-climate-policy scenarios (Fig. 2). The respective ranges for 
the C02 mitigation scenarios and for the sustainable development scenarios are 
smaller. Measures to reduce C02 emissions, mitigate local air pollution, etc. drive 
the energy technology mix in the direction of higher shares of zero-carbon 
technologies. This increases the agreement on the zero-carbon technologies 
among these scenarios. 
In the course of the 21't century, traditional electricity generation technolo-
gies36 based on fossil fuels are phased-out across all scenarios (Fig. 7). In particu-
lar, it is the gas combined-cycle (GasCC, see Fig. 6) technology that bridges the 
transition to more advanced fossil and zero-carbon technologies. In many non-
climate-policy scenarios and in some stabilization scenarios, advanced fossil-
based technologies may become an important option by 2100.37 The high 
uncertainty regarding fossil technologies in the two scenario sets is illustrated by 
the comparatively large ranges for fossil-based fuel cells, for gas combined-
cycle,38 and for advanced coal technologies (e.g., IGCC), shown in Fig. 7. In 
contrast to that, the sustainable development scenarios agree more strongly on 
the future of fossil fuel technologies in the electricity sector. In these scenarios, 
the only relevant fossil fuel in 2100 is gas, and it's market share in 2100 is rather 
small compared to non-fossil options (Fig. 7). 
Comparatively robust conclusions may be drawn from Figs. 6 and 7 concerning 
the adoption of zero-carbon electricity generation technologies in the sustainable 
35 There are two noticeable exceptions (Figs. 6 and 7), where the ranges for the C02 mitigation 
scenarios are larger than those for the non-climate-policy scenarios: gas combined-cycle in 2050, 
and fossil fuel cells in 2100. In some mitigation cases, gas combined-cycle power plants are used 
to substitute less efficient and more carbon-intensive electricity generation from coal. There-
fore, in some cases it is possible that the maximum contribution in the mitigation scenarios is 
even larger than that for the non-policy scenarios. For some other mitigation scenarios, highly 
efficient fuel cells in combination with carbon scrubbing play an important role. Hence, the 
maximum contribution of fossil fuel cells may even exceed their contribution in the non-
climate-policy scenarios. 
36 The traditional electricity generation technologies based on fossil fuels are CoalStdu, 
CoalStda, Oil, and GasStd. For an explanation of the abbreviations, see Appendix II. 
37 Note that in the stabilization scenarios, fossil electricity generation generally occurs in 
combination with carbon scrubbing. 
" Here we refer to gas combined-cycle power plants with and without C02 emissions re-
injection for enhanced oil recovery at field (C02 re-injection is a possible means of using gas for 
electricity generation without emitting C02 in the atmosphere). 
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development scenarios. The sustainable development scenarios agree in that the 
major future contributors to electricity production are hydrogen-based fuel 
cells.39 Their minimum market share of total electricity generation (across all 
sustainable development scenarios) increases from 18% in 2050 to 35% in 2100. 
In contrast, the mitigation scenarios show relatively small market shares for these 
technologies (up to 11 % ), and their occurrence is highly uncertain in non-
climate-policy scenarios (ranging from 0% to 49% in 2100). 
Across all scenarios there is a strong agreement concerning minimum future 
shares for inherently safe future nuclear technologies (around 9% in 2100, see 
"Nuc_HC" in Fig. 7). Their contributions range up to some 35% in non-climate-
policy scenarios and some mitigation scenarios. The maximum share of sustain-
able development scenarios is significantly less at about 19%. 
A robust conclusion across most scenarios is that there is no other single 
dominant technology except hydrogen fuel cells. Relatively uniform sector diver-
sification leads to slim distributions of zero-carbon market shares for electricity 
from hydro, wind, solar and biomass technologies. However, the moderate indi-
vidual market shares sum up to substantial amounts of zero-carbon power 
production. As shown in Figs. 6 and 7, for these technologies the maximum 
and minimum shares are close to the averages. We interpret this as a "robust" 
portfolio mix of future zero-carbon technologies in the electricity sector. This 
may be observed especially for the sustainable development scenarios, and to a 
lesser extent for the C02 stabilization scenarios as well. 
Figures 6 and 7 present only ranges of technology market shares between 
scenarios, but do not answer the questions of which technologies' market shares 
increase in line with each other, or which technologies are substituted for each 
other across all scenarios. Correlation matrices specify the correlation40 (R2) 
between the market shares of technologies. For example, Fig. 8 shows such 
correlation matrices for pairs of (aggregate) zero-carbon vs. fossil fuel technolo-
gies in the electricity sector from 2000 to 2100, presented for all three scenario 
groups. The white squares denote R2 lower than -80%, e.g. in all scenarios PV-
onsite technologies increasingly substitute conventional coal, oil, and gas tech-
nologies (Fig. 8). The black squares denote R2 higher than 80% and mean that 
the market shares of the two technologies evolve in parallel (e.g., hydro power 
plants and conventional coal power plants41 ). Squares with a medium grey colour 
denote correlation pairs with R2 close to zero (Fig. 8). For example, gas com-
39 Note that hydrogen fuel cells do not emit any carbon at the level of electricity production. 
However, the process of hydrogen production itself might cause carbon emissions. This is the 
case when the hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels. Consequently, hydrogen fuel cells may 
only be regarded as a truly zero-carbon electricity option when zero-carbon fuels are also used 
for the hydrogen production itself. 
40 This correlation is often measured with a so-called R2• R2 = 60% for a correlation between 
technology a and b may be interpreted to mean that about 60% of the market share variations 
for technologies a and b could be described by a positive, linear relationship. 
41 Note that we analyze market shares only, i.e., declining global market shares for hydro power 
may still involve significantly increasing hydro power capacities. 
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bined-cycle power plants (GasCC) fall into this category (Fig. 8), because they 
serve as transition technologies. Their market share first increases at a faster rate 
than many zero-carbon technologies, but in the second half of the 21 '1 century 
GasCC experience decreasing global market shares compared to still increasing 
market shares of zero-carbon technologies. Despite all these similarities across 
the three scenario groups, the sustainable development scenarios show the most 
clear-cut pattern in the correlation matrix, i.e., these sustainable development 
scenarios show a continuous replacement of the now dominating fossil fuel 
electricity generation technologies with new renewables such as solar, wind, 
hydrogen fuel cells. In this sense the correlation matrices visualize technology 
clusters in Fig. 8. 
3.2 Transport sector 
Another key sector in terms of future global carbon dioxide emissions is the 
rapidly increasing global transport sector. In a similar way as above, this section 
analyzes shares of and correlations between main energy fuels in the transport 
sector (Figs. 9, 10, and 11). 
There is a strong agreement across all scenarios that today's dominance ofoil 
products in the transport sector will vanish in the medium to long-term future 
(see Figs. 9 and 10). In the medium-term future up to 2050, oil products, synthetic 
liquids from biomass (ethanol), and synthetic liquids from fossil fuels (methanol) 
are the main contributors (Fig. 9). Already in 2050, some scenarios exhibit a 
further diversification with an increasing diffusion of gas, electricity, and hydro-
gen-based technologies. In the later decades of the century, substitution of oil by 
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Fig. 10. Ranges and averages of market shares of the global transport sector for aggregate 
technologies in 2100 
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Fig. 11. Correlation matrices (R2) for market shares of transport fuels from 2000 to 2100. 
Abbreviations used to indicate the aggregate technologies on the horizontal axis are 
explained in Appendix II. Black squares (R2 close to 100%) denote pairs of fuels where 
market shares evolve positively linear (i .e., in parallel and in the same direction), whereas 
white squares (R2 close to -100%) show negatively linear relationships, i.e., transport 
fuels are substitutes for each other throughout the 21" century. Transition fuels show small 
correlations (R2 close to 0) 
ethanol and methanol is increasingly complemented by hydrogen (see Fig. 1). For 
non-climate-policy scenarios and stabilization scenarios, ethanol (> 18% in all 
scenarios in 2100) seems to be a more robust bet than methanol and hydrogen.42 
Conversely, hydrogen and ethanol seem to be the more promising future tech-
nologies for sustainable development scenarios. 
Compared to Figs. 6 and 7, Figs. 9 and 10 show larger ranges for future 
technology market shares. We interpret this to indicate a higher uncertainty 
concerning future technology portfolios in the transport sector than in the elec-
tricity generation sector. 
The correlation matrix (Fig. 11) for the fuels in the transport sector shows 
surprisingly similar patterns for all three scenario groups, although the future 
market shares of the various transport fuels vary substantially. Note also the 
appearance of a methanol/ethanol/H2 technology cluster, in particular in the 
sustainable development scenarios. Finally, the high correlation between gas and 
electricity in the transport sector and that between coal and oil (Fig. 11) should 
not be overinterpreted, since the absolute market shares of coal, electricity, and 
gas in the global transport sector are relatively small in all scenarios (Figs. 9 and 
10), with only few exceptions (such as in gas scenarios). Also note that the share 
of electricity in transport depends on the assumed share of public transportation 
which is mainly a public policy choice.43 
42 Figures 9 and 10 show a very small range for possible shares of transport technologies driven 
from the electricity grid, since no scenario in our sample explored increased large-scale expan-
sion of electrified public transportation systems at the expense of individual mobility. This is 
rather a model input than a model output. 
43 The scenarios presented in this paper illustrate our belief that the strive for individual 
mobility will continue to be a dominating force with rising incomes. However, the scenarios also 
assume certain saturation levels, e.g., even in the most extreme high growth Al scenarios where 
GDP per capita levels converge rapidly, China's energy use in the transport sector will not 
significantly surpass the respective per capita level of the U.S. today. 
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4 Climate change 
What are the possible climate change consequences of selecting one technology 
strategy and therefore one of the emission scenarios (described above) over 
another? As an indicator of the extent of climate impact, we discuss global mean 
temperature change in this section.44 
For all scenarios described in this paper, estimations of all anthropogenic 
sources of the following emissons were included in the analysis: C02, CH4, N20 , 
S02, CFC/HFC/HCFC, PFC, SF6, CO, VOCs, and NOx. Whereas energy-related 
emissions are direct output of the MESSAGE-MACRO model, non-energy-
sector emissions were estimated with a spreadsheet model, using corresponding 
land-use change model runs with equivalent input assumptions from the AIM 
model (see Section 2, and Jiang et al. 2000; Riahi and Roehr! 2000). Data for 
perftuorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), and hydroftuorocarbons 
(HFCs) are taken from Fenhann (2000), and emission trajectories for ozone 
depleting substances covered by the Montreal Protocol (e.g., CFCs, HCFCs) are 
also taken from Fenhann (2000), based on the Montreal Protocol scenario (A3) 
from the 1998 Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion (WMO/UNEP 1998). 
Using these emissions trajectories as inputs to the climate model MAGICC 
(version 2.3; Wigley and Raper 1997), estimates can be made of possible climate 
change consequences.45 
Figure 12 shows global mean temperature changes due to all gases relative to 
1990.46 In 2100, global mean temperature change shows a large range, from 1.6 to 
l.9°C for the sustainable development scenarios, from 2.0 to 3.0°C for the baseline 
reference scenarios, and from 1.8 to 2.1°C for the C02 mitigation scenarios (that 
stabilize at 550ppmv in 2100). Up to about 2050, however, global mean tempera-
ture change is not very different for all the scenarios (Fig. 12), which is due to the 
combined inertia of the energy system and the climate system, and a balancing 
effect of sulfur emissions. As a matter of fact, decreasing sulfur emissions (Fig. 3) 
enhance radiative forcing and GHG-induced warming, whereas decreasing C02 
emissions decrease radiative forcing. Since GHG emissions are generally lowest in 
the sustainable development scenarios, which also have the lowest S02 emissions, 
the two effects counterbalance each other until C02 emissions start differing 
substantially among the different scenarios and S02 emissions have reached a very 
low level (from which not much further sulfur reduction is possible) . 
44 We could just as well discuss radiative forcing, or sea level rise. One of the most obvious 
differences in these indicators is illustrated by different time lags between radiative forcing, 
~lobal mean temperature change, and sea level rise. 
5 Model version 2.3 supports regionalized (three world regions) S02 emissions input data, 
which are needed to calculate the regionally different cooling effects of sulfate aerosols. For 
radiative forcing we use the latest parameterizations reported in Myhre et al. (1998). The other 
model input parameters for MAG ICC used here are similar to those used by the IPCC in the 
Second Assessment Report (IPCC 1996). 
46 Note that radiative forcing shows a similar pattern to global mean temperature change, 
where the latter is subject to a time lag. 
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Fig. 12. Global mean temperature changes in °C assuming an intermediate "best guess" 
climate sensitivity of 2.5°C for a doubling of C02 concentration 
In contrast to the other scenarios, the coal-intensive baseline AlC and A2 
scenarios first experience a rapid increase in global S02 emissions until 2040, and 
then an eventual decline (Fig. 3). Until 2090 this produces a strong negative 
radiative forcing (or cooling) effect in AlC and A2.47 As a consequence, global 
mean temperature change for AlC and A2 is lower than in the other cases until 
about 2050, although C02 emissions in the AlC and A2 baselines are the highest 
among all the scenarios examined in this paper. 
These estimates are for a "best guess" climate sensitivity of 2.5°C (i.e. 2.5°C 
warming for a doubling of atmospheric C02 levels (IPCC 1996)). However, the 
climate sensitivity parameter is highly uncertain. Often lower bounds for climate 
sensitivity parameters of 1.5°C and higher bounds of 4.5°C are suggested (IPCC 
1996), which would change our results dramatically. For example, if we use these 
bounds for climate sensitivity to calculate an "uncertainty range" for global mean 
temperature change in 2100 (relative to 1990), this range is from l.4°C to 2.9°C 
for the B2 baseline scenario alone, compared to a "best guess" estimate for B2 of 
2.0°C. Note that this "uncertainty range" for B2 is as large as the range of best 
guesses over all scenarios (1.6°C for BlT to 3.0°C for AlC in 2100) discussed in 
this paper. 
5 Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the robustness of different technology portfolios 
under a wide range of possible future socioeconomic and technological out-
comes, illustrated by 13 global energy-economic development scenarios for the 
47 Summing the direct and indirect effects of S04 • 
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21 51 century. For this purpose we compared three different groups of scenarios: 
non-climate-policy scenarios that do not assume direct climate policies, and 
are part of the IPCC's Special Report on Emissions (SRES 2000), sustainable 
development scenarios, which form a subset of the latter scenario group, and are 
based on a range of non-climate-policies that generally ensure emissions com-
parable to the lower bound emissions range of the non-climate-policy scenarios, 
and C02 mitigation scenarios, which assume climate policies that are aimed at 
stabilizing atmospheric C02 concentrations at a level of 550ppmv shortly after 
2100. 
The non-climate-policy scenarios explore alternative development pathways of 
socioeconomic development and technological change. The range of emissions 
that results from varying technological change (e.g., the range from AlT to AlC) 
is as large as the range of emissions spanned by varying both technological 
improvement rates and socioeconomic development (e.g., the range from Bl to 
A2). This illustrates the importance of technological change as one of the major 
driving forces of future emissions. 
Baseline assumptions on technological development, resource availability, and 
economic development strongly influence the choice of emissions mitigation 
strategies in the stabilization/mitigation cases. Of all the available C02 emissions 
reduction measures, no one single measure will be sufficient for the timely 
development, adoption, and diffusion of mitigation options sufficient to stabilize 
the atmospheric composition. Rather, a portfolio based on technological change, 
economic incentives, and institutional frameworks will be adopted. Three major 
contributors to the emissions reduction of the C02 mitigation scenarios could be 
identified: carbon scrubbing and removal, structural shifts in the energy structure 
away from carbon-intensive fuels (such as coal), and price induced demand 
reductions due to increased energy prices in the mitigation scenarios. The gross 
world product gap between the stabilization scenarios and their respective miti-
gation scenarios ranges from 0.5% to 2.6% in 2100. Compared to the economic 
growth of the scenarios the GWP losses are very small, which indicates that 
atmospheric carbon concentration stabilization at 550ppmv is possible at modest 
costs. The losses were highest in AlC-550, a high-growth scenario that experi-
ences a strong lock-in into a coal-based, synthetic fuel economy. 
The central result of this paper is the conclusions on which energy technology 
portfolios are "robust" under a wide range of possible future socioeconomic and 
technological outcomes. The technology robustness analysis shows which tradi-
tional electricity generation technologies based on fossil fuels are phased out 
across all scenarios in the course of the 21'1 century. In particular, it is the gas 
combined-cycle technology that bridges the transition to more advanced fossil 
and zero-carbon technologies. There is also a high agreement concerning the 
adoption of zero-carbon electricity technologies in the sustainable development 
scenarios, which indicates that the major future contributors to electricity pro-
duction are hydrogen-based fuel cells. A robust conclusion across most scenarios 
is that there is no single dominant technology except hydrogen fuel cells. Rela-
tively uniform sector diversification leads to slim distributions of zero-carbon 
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market shares for electricity from hydro, wind, solar, and biomass technologies. 
In the transport sector, today's dominance of oil products will vanish in the 
medium to long-term future, however, it remains uncertain which technologies 
are the most promising to replace the gasoline-powered automobile in the long 
run. We find that even in fossil-fuel-intensive scenarios, the long-term technology 
portfolio needs to include improvements in zero-carbon options and gas-related 
technologies and infrastructures. Innovative "transitional" strategies of using 
natural gas as a "bridge" toward a carbon-free hydrogen economy (including 
C02 sequestration) are also at a premium in a possible future world with low 
emissions. 
To calculate expected global mean temperature change for the different sce-
narios, estimations for all anthropogenic sources of C02, CH4, N20, S02, CFC/ 
HFC/HCFC, PFC, SF6, CO, voes, and NOX were calculated. Up to 2050, global 
mean temperature change is not very different for all the scenarios, which is due 
to the combined inertia of the energy system and the climate system, and a 
balancing effect of sulfur emissions. Temperature change in 2100 shows a large 
range, from 1.6 to l.9°C for the sustainable development scenarios, from 2.0 to 
3.0°C for the baseline reference scenarios, and from 1.8 to 2.1°C for the C02 
mitigation scenarios. Controls of sulfur emissions could amplify possible climate 
change in the medium-term perspective. On the other hand, for the coal-
intensive AlC and A2 scenarios, global mean temperature change is lower than 
in the other cases until about 2050. Therefore, tradeoffs are likely to persist for 
environmental policies throughout the 21'1 century. Note that hedging strategies 
are particularly important, as climate model uncertainties are larger than the 
range of best guess climate change estimates for emissions trajectories from 
futures that differ widely in terms of their socioeconomic, institutional, and 
technological development. 
Finally, we suggest future international climate change agreements to take a 
long-term view of actively managing risk related to future socioeconomic, institu-
tional, and technological development. 
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This Appendix briefly summaries the main characteristics of the modeling framework that was used 
by the authors to quantify the illustrative scenarios (i.e. , alternative future pathways) of the global 
energy system and GHG emissions presented in this paper. For a more detailed description of the 
model methodology used, please see Riahi and Roehr! (2000), Roehr! and Riahi (2000), and 
Nakicenovic (ed.) (2000). 
Figure 13 shows the principal models and data sets that were used. These include the Scenario 
Generator (SG) (Nakicenovic et al. 1998a and b), the bottom-up energy systems engineering model 
MESSAGE4 (Messner and Strubegger 1995), the top-down macroeconomic model MACRO 
(Messner and Schrattenholzer 1999). The climate impact model MAGICC5 (Wigley and Raper 1997), 
and several databases, including the C02DB (Messner and Strubegger 1991 ). 
The Scenario Generator (SG) is a global simulation model, and it is the starting point for any 
quantification of economic and energy development scenarios. The SG provides common, consistent 
input data for MESSAGE and MACRO. Exogenous inputs to the SG are future population trajec-
tories for 11 world regions used by MESSAGE plus key parameters determining regional per capita 
GDP growth. The SG uses a set of regression equations from historical economic and energy data to 
estimate regional fin al energy trajectories, which are then disaggregated into the six demand sectors 
used by MESSAGE. 
The Systems Engineering Model MESSAGE (version JV) is a systems engineering optimization 
model used for medium- to long-term energy system planning and policy analysis. The model 
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mm1mizes total discounted energy system costs, and provides information on the utilization of 
domestic resources, energy imports and exports and trade-related monetary flows, investment 
requirements, the types of production or conversion technologies selected (technology substitution), 
pollutant emissions, and interfuel substitution processes, as well as temporal trajectories for primary, 
secondary, final, and useful energy. Important inputs for MESSAGE are technology costs and other 
technology parameters, which are taken from the energy technology database C02DB.48 
MACRO is a top-down macroeconomic model. Its objective function is the total discounted utility 
of a single representative producer-consumer. The maximization of this utility function determines a 
sequence of optimal savings, investment, and consumption decisions. In turn, savings and investment 
determine the capital stock. The capital stock, available labor, and energy inputs determine the total 
output of an economy according to a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
function . Energy demand in two categories (electricity and non-electric energy) is determined within 
the model , consistent with the development of energy prices and the energy intensity of GDP. 
MACRO is linked to MESSAGE, and in an iterative fashion, internally consistent projections of 
realized GDP, and energy demand, that take price-effects into account. 
To estimate aggregate climate impacts of the scenarios, we used Version 2.3 of the climate change 
model MAGICC. The model estimates net carbon flows and atmospheric C02 concentrations,'9 
changes in radiative forcing and temperature relative to 1990, and sea level rise. 
48 C02DB currently includes more than 1600 technologies and associated information on their 
recent, current, and projected costs, efficiencies, and environmental characteristics. 
49 MAGlCC includes a carbon cycle model that relates atmospheric inputs (emissions) and 
outputs (physical and chemical sink processes) to changes in the atmospheric carbon con-
centration. It uses carbon dioxide (C02) , methane (CH4), sulfur dioxide (S02), and nitrogen 
oxide (NOx) energy-rela ted emissions from MESSAGE together with emission profiles for 
o ther greenhouse gases and non-energy related activities from the spreadsheet emissions 
model. 
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Table 4. Aggregate technologies in the electricity generation sector 
Abbreviation Technology Description 
CoalStdu Coal power plant, no FGD, no DENOX 
CoalStda Coal power plant, 90% FGD, 50% DENOX 
CoalAdv Advanced coal power plants; e.g., integrated gasification combined-cycle 
(IGCC) 
FossilFC Gas- and coal-based fuel cells 
Oil Oil power plants 
GasStd Gas power plant (standard steam cycle) 
Gas CC Gas combined-cycle power plant 
GasReinj Combined cycle power plant with no C02 emissions (re-injected for 
enhanced oil recovery at field) , efficiency reduced by 1 % 
BioSTC Biomass power plant (standard steam cycle) 
Bio_GTC Biomass gasification power plant 
Waste Waste power plant 
Nuc_LC Conventional nuclear power plant, low costs, low efficiency 
Nuc_HC Conventional nuclear power plant, high costs, high efficiency 
Nuc&O-Carb Other advanced zero-carbon technologies (including high temperature 
and fast breeder reactors) 
Hydro Hydroelectric power plant 
SolarTh Solar thermal power plant with storage, and solar thermal power plant 
for H2 production 
Solar PY Solar photovoltaic power plant (no storage) 
Wind Wind power plant 
Geothrm Geothermal power plant 
H2FC Electricity from hydrogen fuel cells in the industry and the residential 
sector, off-peak electricity production via hydrogen-based fuel cells in 
the transport sector 
PV-ons Photovoltaic onsite electricity production 
Due to the high degree of technological detail in MESSAGE, it was not possible to report results for 
each individual technology 
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